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I. INTRODUCTION

In the post World War II era, an estimated 170 million civilians, not
including soldiers, have been victims' of "atrocity crimes" such as genocide,
crimes against humanity, grave war crimes, and other gross human rights
violations.2 But the culprits have nearly always escaped punishment, as their
atrocities have generally been tolerated by national authorities in their
respective countries, as well as by the international community. For instance,
in Argentina, between 1975 and 1981, a military junta purged an estimated
30,000 "leftists" during its "Dirty War Against Subversion."3 Many were
tortured in secret prisons or killed by being thrown out of airplanes over the
4
sea. The purges and intimidation tactics targeted anyone suspected of dissent.
In private conversations, top military officers argued that the purges would be
justified if only 5% of all victims were actual rebels.5 Luiz Urquiza is a
survivor of the Dirty War.6 He was jailed, tortured, and even taken before a
hoax firing squad. However, he was not killed and knew the identities of
several of his repressors. After exiling himself in Europe, he returned to
Argentina in 1994 when he discovered that his repressors had become senior
commanders in the Argentine police. His return was greeted with a volley of
death threats.7 In 1997, he gave his first testimony about his persecution to a
judge, although it was not in an Argentine courtroom. Rather, he was in
Madrid addressing Judge Baltasar Garz6n ofthe National Audience, a Spanish
high court.'
Spain has recognized its universal jurisdiction to prosecute entirely foreign
atrocity crimes as a step toward ending impunity for gross human rights
abuses. Spanish officials led several major prosecutions, notably against
former Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet, for genocide, torture, and other
1 Jamison G. White, Note, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide:Augusto Pinochet,Universal
Jurisdiction,the ICC, anda Wake-Up CallforFormerHeads of State, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
127, 128 (1999) (citing R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT (1994)).
2 David J. Scheffer, The Future of Atrocity Law, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 389,

395-96 (2002).
I DANIEL K. LEWIS, THE HISTORY OF ARGENTINA 134, 143-46 (2001); Spain s Uncharted
Foray into World Justice, EL PAiS (English version) (Spain), Dec. 22, 2005, at 4.
' LEWIS, supranote 3, at 143-46; CARLOS SANTiAGONINo,RADICALEVILONTRIAL 54, 56
(1996).
5 NINO, supranote 4, at 56.
6 See Spain's UnchartedForay into World Justice, supra note 3.
7 Id.
8Id.
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atrocities;9 against Guatemalan generals for genocide, torture, and statesponsored terrorism against the Mayan people between 1978 and 1986;'o and
against several repressors of Argentina's Dirty War."
However, the appropriate scope of universal jurisdiction law is a matter of
ongoing debate. Spain's high courts clashed on whether international law
permits states to unilaterally prosecute atrocities allegedly committed by
foreigners against other foreigners in a foreign country, devoid of any link to
the prosecuting state. In November 2004, the Spanish Supreme Court tried to
narrow Spain' s universal jurisdiction by essentially requiring a link to national
interests, in an effort to rein in prosecutions that it felt had gone too far.' 2 In
September 2005, the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal overruled this decision,
holding that no such link was necessary, blasting the Supreme Court's
reasoning and authorizing Spanish courts to exercise broad universal
jurisdiction. 3 This decision had the immediate practical consequence of
encouraging alleged victims to introduce a criminal complaint against former
Chinese president, Jiang Zemin, and other officials for genocide in Tibet. 4 In
a separate case, several exiled Chinese citizens filed a complaint against
different officials alleging genocide and torture of Falun Gong members. 5
This Article focuses on universal jurisdiction in Spain in the aftermath of
the Constitutional Tribunal's decision. First, I examine the doctrine of
universal jurisdiction, its origins, and its modern application. Second, after a
brief overview of the Spanish legal system, I respectively analyze the Supreme
Court and Constitutional Tribunal opinions. Third, I identify several
procedural restraints, thereby underlining that Spain does not authorize pure
universal jurisdiction. Fourth, I assess whether Spain's still relatively broad
jurisdiction violates international law. Fifth, I argue that the expansion of
9 White, supra note 1, at 144-47.
0 Herv6 Ascensio, The Spanish ConstitutionalTribunal'sDecisionin Guatemalan Generals:
UnconditionalUniversality is Back, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 586 (2006); STC, Sept. 26, 2005

(S.T.C., No. 237) § I, availableat http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/guatemala/doc/tcgtml.html.
" Spain's UnchartedForayinto WorldJustice, supranote 3; Luis Mendez, Reclamanpara
Cavallo 30 Mil Ahos de Prisidn,REFORMA (Mex.), Feb. 26, 2006.
12 STS, Nov. 15, 2004 (J.T.S., No. 1362), available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/
espana/juicioral/doc/stscilingo.html.
13 STC, Sept. 26, 2005.
"4Jos6 Yoldi, La Audiencia Perseguirdal Ex Presidente Chinopor Genocidio en el Tibet,
EL PAiS (Spain), Jan. 11, 2006; Pekin Convoca al EmbajadorEspaholpara Quejarse de las
Imputaciones de Genocidio, EL PAiS (Spain), June 9, 2006, at 31 [hereinafter Pekin].
"SNatalia Junquera, Se Presentaen Madridun Informe sobre Trdfico de 6 rganosen China,
EL PAiS (Spain), Nov. 29, 2006.
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universal jurisdiction in Spain and other countries could justify the creation of
a procedural mechanism to resolve competing jurisdictional claims over the
same defendants. Finally, I suggest that legislators may eventually abrogate
or narrow Spain's universal jurisdiction law due to diplomatic problems in
spite of its deterrent value and intrinsic worth as a means of defending human
rights.
II. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN NATIONAL COURTS
Jurisdiction empowers a court to hear a case.16 But defining universal
jurisdiction is an intricate task considering that there is neither a consensus on
what universal jurisdiction is or should be, nor a consensus regarding the
crimes covered by the doctrine. 7 One perspective defines it as broad
jurisdiction based solely on the substantive nature of the crime, regardless of
its location, the nationality of the accused or the victims, or any other
connection to the prosecuting state.' 8 Another view favors narrower
jurisdiction with procedural requirements in the form of links between the
prosecuting state and the offense, such as a combination of "territorial
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, passive jurisdiction, and protective
jurisdiction."' 9 As we shall see, the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal and
Supreme Court differed sharply on whether such procedural requirements are
needed.
In practice, countries exercising universal jurisdiction differ on whether
custody of the accused is procedurally required before initiating proceedings.
Under conditionaluniversaljurisdiction, a state may prosecute a defendant
only if he is in custody, as under the laws of Austria, France, and
Switzerland.2" Moreover, customary law has historically required states to
exercise universal jurisdiction to prosecute pirates in their custody.2 Further,
at the treaty level, states are required to prosecute the accused through
universal jurisdiction or extradite him to a concerned state when he is
suspected of "grave breaches" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the First

See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 277 (2003).
17 Scheffer, supranote 2, at 423.
'S PRINCETON UNIV. PROGRAM IN LAW & PUB. AFFAIRS, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON
16

UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 28 (2001), available at http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/
princeton.html [hereinafter PRINCETON PRINCIPLES].

" Scheffer, supra note 2, at 429.
supra note 16, at 285-86.
2 Id. at 284.
20 CASSESE,
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Additional Protocol of 1977, torture under Article 7 of the 1984 Torture
Convention, and terrorism under various United Nations (U.N.) treaties. 2
Conversely, under absolute universaljurisdiction,a state may prosecute a
defendant regardless of whether he is in custody. 23 This view ofjurisdiction is
recognized by certain Western European countries, including Belgium and
Spain.24 While Spain and many other states prohibit trials in absentia,absolute
universal jurisdiction enables them to initiate criminal proceedings even when
an accused has never set foot in their territory,25 and an extradition may be
sought to force him into the country to attend trial. Belgium went even further
in permitting trials in absentia until political pressure forced it to amend its
universal jurisdiction law, as discussed below. 26 Accordingly, the main
difference between conditional and absolute universal jurisdiction is that,
under the latter, judicial authorities are not constrained to wait for the accused
to come onto their territory to prosecute him, thereby resulting in much broader
jurisdictional power to prosecute, what I term, foreign atrocity crimes:
atrocities committed by foreigners against other foreigners in a foreign
country.
While I will later examine whether a broad exercise of universal
jurisdiction is permitted by international law, I must first emphasize that the
recent drive to prosecute foreign atrocity crimes in national courts based on
universal jurisdiction is virtually unprecedented. Unquestionably, universal
jurisdiction is not nearly as well established as the fundamental principles of
territorial jurisdiction and active or passive nationality jurisdiction. Some
form of universal jurisdiction has nonetheless existed for centuries. In the
Middle Ages, "[j]urists ...assumed that certain dangerous criminals posed a
threat to the societies in which they were found . . . [Hence], these
jurisdictions were entitled to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by

22

Id. at 285-86.

23 Id. at 286.
24 Id. at 287.
25 Id. at 286-87.
26 See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
27 A state has territorial jurisdiction when a crime or one of its elements is committed on its

territory or when its effects are felt therein. CASSESE, supra note 16, at 277-78. Active
nationalityjurisdiction typically enables a state to prosecute its citizens for foreign crimes so they
do not escape justice altogether when extradition to the territorial state is impossible or would
result in an unfair proceeding. Id. at 281-82. Passive nationality jurisdiction allows a state to
prosecute foreign crimes committed against its citizens in order to protect its citizens when they
are abroad and when there is "substantial mistrust" in the territorial state's capacity to bring
justice. Id.at 282.
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these actors in other jurisdictions."2 But universal jurisdiction was not based
on the substantive heinousness of the offense per se, as procedure required the
accused's presence in the jurisdiction.2 9
Moreover, "[f]or as long as
sovereignty-based jurisdictional principles have existed (that is, at least since
the early seventeenth century), any nation could try any pirates it caught,
regardless of the pirates' nationality or where on the high seas they were
apprehended., 3' However, most jurists today falsely assume that piracy was
universally cognizable due to the heinousness of preying on civilian ships: "To
the contrary, the law of every nation and the law of nations countenanced such
behavior when carried out by state-licensed sea-robbers called privateers."'"
Neither the Middle Ages nor piracy cases provide a tenable precedent to
support the extension of universal jurisdiction to crimes chosen precisely
because of their heinousness, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and
torture.32
Universal jurisdiction for atrocity crimes only emerged in the post World
War II era. While the Nuremberg Trials rested on another doctrine, 33 some
military and civilian courts claimed universal jurisdiction to prosecute the
Nazis' crimes. 34 Notably, the Israeli Supreme Court held that it had universal
28 Ryan Rabinovitch, UniversalJurisdictionin Absentia, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 500, 517
(2005) (citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: THE DUTY OF STATES TO
ENACT AND ENFORCE LEGISLATION (2001), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/
engior530042001 (last visited Nov. 14,2004)); see also Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo
v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 36 (Feb. 14) (separate opinion of President Guillaume).

29 Rabinovitch, supra note 28, at 518.
30 Eugene Kontorovich, The PiracyAnalogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow

Foundation,45 HARv. INT'L L.J. 183, 190 (2004).

" Id. at 210. Novels and movies have given pirates a "reputation for torturing and
murdering captives." Id.at 215. But these atrocities were hardly inherent to the international
crime of piracy, which was simply considered robbery on the high seas. Id. at 191, 223. No
universal jurisdiction over torture and murder existed per se, whether committed on the high seas
or not. Id.at 215. But even pirates who never mistreated their victims were fully subjected to
universal jurisdiction. Id.Besides, courts were well aware that "privateers often committed the
same atrocities as pirates ....Id.In fact, "[p]irates were often laid-off privateers." Id. at 216.
Thus, seizing ships and cargos at sea by force was not considered extraordinarily heinous
conduct. Id.at 210.
32 Id. at 210-11. The piracy analogy is also flawed because pirate acts were for private gain,
while atrocity crimes are frequently perpetrated under public authority. Madeline H. Morris,
UniversalJurisdictionin a Divided World, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 337, 345 (2001).
3 The Nuremberg Tribunal stressed that the German Reich had unconditionally surrendered,
thereby giving the Allies sovereign powers to prosecute Germans. Morris, supranote 32, at 344.
"4See Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with

DemocraticPrinciples, 92 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1116 (2004). For example, one case held: "An
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jurisdiction to try Adolf Eichmann for crimes against humanity and other
atrocities. 5 However, the expansion of prosecutions in national courts did not
occur before the 1990s, during which time
criminal complaints or investigations have been instituted before
courts in Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom for atrocities in Europe, Africa and South America....
More controversially, criminal complaints have been filed in
Belgium -- until recently, the world capital of universal
jurisdiction -- against current or former leaders of Chad, Cuba,
Iraq, Iran, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Ivory Coast,
the Palestinian Authority, Israel, the United States, and other
countries."
Alongside Belgium, Spain has been at the forefront of the universal
jurisdiction agenda. In 1996, Spanish investigative "magistrate Baltazar [sic]
Garz6n and Spanish prosecutors in Valencia began a crusade to vindicate gross
human rights violations" in Spanish courts.37 They charged current and former
Argentine officials with atrocities committed during the Dirty War.3" In 1998,
Judge Garz6n became famous for demanding the extradition of former Chilean
dictator, General Augusto Pinochet, from the United Kingdom where he had
traveled for medical surgery.3 9 Pinochet had been untouchable until then
despite his dreadful legacy. On September 11, 1973, General Pinochet led a
bloody coup overthrowing then-president Salvador Allende, a democratically
elected socialist.40 Pinochet subsequently banned all political parties,

international crime is such an act universally recognised as criminal, which is considered a grave
matter of international concern and for some valid reason cannot be left within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the state that would have control over it under ordinary circumstances." United
States v. List (The Hostages Trial) (U.S. Mil. Trib. Nuremberg 1948), in 8 LAW REPORTS OF
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 34 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n ed., 1949).
35 CASSESE, supra note 16, at 293.
36 Orentlicher, supra note 34, at 1059-60 (footnotes omitted).
31 Julia K. Boyle, Note, The InternationalObligationto ProsecuteHumanRights Violators:
Spain'sJurisdictionOver Argentine Dirty War Participants,22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 187, 189 (1998).
38 Id.
31 White, supra note 1, at 144.
40 Jonathan Kandell, Augusto Pinochet, 91, Dictator Who Ruled by Terror in Chile, Dies,
N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 11, 2006, at 1.
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dissolved Congress, and abandoned the constitution. By the time his
seventeen-year rule ended in 1990, his dictatorship was responsible for the
execution or disappearance of more than 3,200 people.4 ' Thousands more
were detained and tortured or forced into exile. 42 The vast majority of all
victims were.nonviolent.43 Pinochet also embezzled at least $28 million that
he kept in more than 100 secret bank accounts, most of them in the United
States.'
Judge Garz6n invoked universal jurisdiction to prosecute Pinochet for
genocide, torture, and other atrocities against scores of political opponents.45
But Pinochet and the Chilean government objected that extradition would
violate Chilean sovereignty since Pinochet was immune from prosecution. 6
Nevertheless, a judicial panel of Law Lords held that under the British
codification of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention), extraterritorial
torture was an extraditable offense and that Pinochet did not enjoy absolute
immunity from prosecution.47 While the British executive ultimately allowed
Pinochet to return to Chile due to his failing health, his arrest, sixteen
undignified months in detention, and an unsuccessful immunity claim marked
a shift in international practice toward ending impunity for brutal dictators.48
Until Pinochet,judicial authorities had generally declined to judge the acts of
foreign officials.49
Despite Pinochet'srelative success, Spain's endeavor to prosecute foreign
atrocity crimes was controversial. Human rights groups generally supported
the effort.5 Spain's attempt to prosecute Pinochet was also backed with
"similar extradition requests . . . from at least seven countries."'" Yet,

Id.
Id.
43 Id.
44 Editorial, The Dextrous Dictator,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2006, at 26.
41 White, supranote 1, at 144.
46 Id. at 147. As a condition for stepping down, Pinochet obtained a lifetime
senatorship that
made him immune from prosecution. Orentlicher, supranote 34, at 1071. But this arrangement
was far from democratic, as Pinochet had threatened a coup if his de facto self-amnesty was
challenged. Id. at 1123.
" Orentlicher, supra note 34, at 1080.
48 Warren Hoge, After 16 Months of House Arrest, Pinochet Quits England, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2000, at 6.
49 See Orentlicher, supra note 34, at 1059.
50 See, e.g., White, supra note 1, at 146.
5'Id.at 147.
41
42
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pragmatists warned that Spain should not espouse a radical form of universal
jurisdiction devoid of strong procedural footing that could violate international
customary law and harm diplomatic relations.52 Most important, the states
whose citizens were prosecuted vehemently protested what they perceived as
a violation oftheir sovereignty over national criminal justice matters. 3 Facing
the same challenge, Belgium finally caved in to intense political pressure,
especially from the United States,54 and significantly narrowed its own
universal jurisdiction law in 2003." 5 Around the same time, the Spanish
Supreme Court also decided to narrow Spain's universal jurisdiction to rein in
prosecutions that it felt had gone too far;56 however, the Constitutional
Tribunal overruled this decision.57

See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 30, at 183-84.
" See Marlise Simons, Pinochet 'sSpanish Pursuer: Magistrateof Explosive Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at 1.
" After American officials were charged with various crimes by Belgian courts, "Secretary
of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld warned that the United States would withhold further funding
for a new NATO headquarters building in Brussels and that senior U.S. officials may stop
visiting Belgium unless it repealed its already diminished law on universal jurisdiction."
Orentlicher, supra note 34, at 1062 (citing Vernon Loeb, Rumsfeld Says Belgian Law Could
Imperil Fundsfor NA TO, WASH. POST, June 13, 2003, at A24); see also Craig S. Smith, NATO
Agrees to U.S. Proposalsto Revamp Alliance, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2003, at 3.
5 Steven R. Ratner, Editorial Comment, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem,97
AM. J. INT'L L. 888 (2003). Belgium now
(1) limits jurisdiction of Belgian courts to cases in which (a) the accused is a
national of Belgium or has his primary residence in Belgium, or (b) the victim
is a national of Belgium or has resided in Belgium for at least 3 years; and (2)
provides that criminal actions under this law may only be initiated by the
federal prosecutor, who will evaluate individual complaints, and that the
decision of the federal prosecutor is not subject to review. The amendment
also specifically provides for immunity for heads of State and other
government officials, and bars criminal action against certain persons
officially invited by Belgian authorities or international organizations based
in Belgium.
Malvina Halberstam, Belgium 's UniversalJurisdictionLaw: Vindication oflnternationalJustice
or Pursuitof Politics?,25 CARDozo L. REv. 247, 264 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
56 Prior to its decision of November 15, 2004, the Spanish Supreme Court had narrowed
universal jurisdiction in a separate case regarding Guatemala on February 25, 2003. See STS,
Feb. 25, 2003 (J.T.S., No. 327), availableat http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/guatemala/doc/
gtmsent.html. Because the holdings are remarkably similar, I focus only on the 2004 case for
brevity's sake.
17 STC, Sept. 26, 2005 (S.T.C., No. 237).
52
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SPAIN'S HIGH COURTS CLASH ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

Spain is a parliamentary and constitutional monarchy with a democratic
political system. The Tribunal Constitucional(Constitutional Tribunal) is the
highest court. It must uphold and interpret the constitution, which provides
significant rights for the accused in conformance with international due
process standards." Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the Constitutional Tribunal
has judicial review power over the actions of other state organs.59 The
Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) is the highest court for all nonconstitutional matters. It must abide by the Tribunal's constitutional rulings.60
The Audiencia Nacional (National Audience) is a lower court responsible for
matters of international and national interest, including international crimes,
terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, political corruption, and
extradition proceedings.61 Depending on the crime, the court has either
original or appellate jurisdiction.62 Appeals of the National Audience's
decisions are first heard by the Supreme Court, whose decisions may also be
appealed to the Constitutional Tribunal if they entail constitutional issues.
Spain is party to numerous international humanitarian and criminal law
treaties, including the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) and Torture Convention.6 3 Spain
also recognizes its universal jurisdiction to try foreign atrocity crimes. Article
23.4 of Spain's Law on Judicial Power posits that "Spanish jurisdiction is
competent to try acts committed by Spaniards or foreigners outside the national
territory" for crimes recognized "under Spanish law" as, interalia,"genocide,"
"terrorism," and crimes that, "under international treaties and agreements, must

" See Dennis P. Riordan, The Rights to a FairTrial and to Examine Witnesses Under the
Spanish Constitutionand the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 373, 382-84 (1999).
19CHARLOTTE VILLEiRS, THE SPANISH LEGAL TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SPANISH
LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM 43-44 (1999).
60

Id.

6' Id. at
62

128.
Id. at 128-29.

63

Boyle, supra note 37, at 188-89. Spain's international treaties are self-executing and

automatically incorporated into domestic law once signed and ratified, unless they conflict with
the constitution. VILLIERS, supra note 59, at 50. It is worth mentioning that the Spanish
Supreme Court strongly criticized the detention of "enemy combatants" by the United States at
Guant namo, Cuba as violating human rights. See Josd Yoldi, El Supremo Absuelve al Taliban
EspaholyDice que GuantdnamoNo Tiene Justificaci6n,EL PAiS (Spain), July 25, 2006, at 21.

2007]

SPAIN'S EXPANDED UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

be prosecuted in Spain."' The Supreme Court and Constitutional Tribunal
have sharply disagreed on the scope of Spain's universal jurisdiction under
treaty law and Article 23.4.
A. The Supreme CourtDecision65
In 1995, Adolfo Scilingo, an Argentine navy officer, confessed to
"murdering dozens of detainees by dumping their drugged bodies from a
helicopter into the sea" during Argentina's Dirty War.66 In 1997, Scilingo
voluntarily traveled to Spain to appear in a television show and was summoned
to court to testify about his crimes.67 He was arrested after reiterating his
confession.6" In 2004, after a series of appeals, the Supreme Court eventually
held that Spain had jurisdiction to try Scilingo for genocide, terrorism, and
torture.69 In his defense, Scilingo argued that Spain lacked jurisdiction to try
him, partly because he is an Argentine citizen and the crimes occurred in
Argentina; however, the Constitutional Tribunal denied Scilingo's appeal and
remanded the case to a lower criminal court.7 °
The Supreme Court ruled on two narrow jurisdictional bases. First, some
of Scilingo's alleged victims were Spanish citizens. The court succinctly listed
several international criminal law treaties as creating "jurisdictional criteria
that are generally based on territory or active or passive personality."'" While

Ley Org~nica del Poder Judicial [L.O.P.J.] [Law on Judicial Power], art. 23.4 (Spain).

65 Quotations from Spanish court decisions have been translated by the author.
66 Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105

COLUM. L. REv. 1751, 1855 n.485 (2005); see also LEWIS, supra note 3, at 143-46.
67 Argentine Arrested in Spanish 'Dirty War'Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1997, at 4.
68 Id.
69 STS, Nov. 15, 2004 (J.T.S., No. 1362); see also Julio M. Lazaro, El Supremo Deja Via
Libreparaque la Audiencia Juzgue a Scilingo, EL PAiS (Spain), Nov. 17, 2004, at 22.
70 STS, Nov. 15, 2004, § II. First, Scilingo argued that he should be tried in Argentina, but
the court noted that he had not been charged in Argentina for the crimes for which he was
charged in Spain. Id. Second, he contended that Argentina did not recognize Spanish courts'
jurisdiction, yet, the court underlined that Argentine authorities had previously arrested and
extradited suspects wanted by Spain. Id. Third, he claimed that he was protected by amnesty
laws shielding military officers from prosecution. The Tribunal countered that this amnesty had
"no value" outside Argentina. Id.
7 The Genocide Convention, Torture Convention, Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Convention on the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Convention against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Convention for the Suppression
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the court technically held that the existence of Spanish victims gave Spain a
"national interest" to exercise universal jurisdiction, its decision effectively
amounted to ruling on the basis of passive personality jurisdiction and not on
the basis of universal jurisdiction. Second, the court held that Scilingo's
presence on Spanish territory provided an alternative basis forjurisdiction. It
held that international criminal law treaties" create "an obligation to try the
alleged culprits when they are present on one's territory and extradition has
been denied."7 3 Under these circumstances, states must "prosecute the crimes,
whatever their place of commission . . . thereby preventing an organized
response against impunity by suppressing the possibility that some states
would be used as safe havens. 74 By allowing the prosecution of alleged
culprits apprehended on Spanish territory, the court endorsed the aforesaid
principle of conditional universal jurisdiction. 5 Hence, the court provided two
relatively narrow bases for Spanish jurisdiction, which it limited to the small
proportion of cases involving either Spanish citizens or foreign defendants who
rather foolhardily venture into Spanish territory and are apprehended therein
like Scilingo.
Aside from situations where Spain is obliged by treaty to prosecute or
extradite alleged culprits on its territory, the Supreme Court emphasized that
the exercise of national jurisdiction requires a procedural link to national
interests, which it reduced to the protection of citizens through active or
personality jurisdiction and the defense or protection of other interests,
implying the prosecution of defendants threatening national security or
economic interests.76 Its rationale was that "jurisdiction is a manifestation of
state sovereignty. ' A state's jurisdiction reaches only as-far as its national
interests, as going farther would interfere with the sovereignty of other states.
Accordingly, the court held that universal jurisdiction is only justified by the
union of "the common interest in avoiding impunity for atrocity crimes with
the concrete interest of a state in protecting [its national interests].'

of the Financing of Terrorism, and European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. Id.

§ II.6, 5.
72

Id.

73 Id.
74 Id.

75 See CASSESE, supra note 16, at 284-86.

STS, Nov. 15, 2004, § 11.6,
Id.
78 Id.
76

77

6.
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The court found that broader universal jurisdiction would violate "criteria
of reasonableness" and the "principle of non-intervention" in another state's
affairs.79 No treaty "has expressly authorized a state to prosecute, without
limitation whatsoever and relying only on domestic law, acts that occurred in
the territory of another state."80
The court identified the principle of non-intervention into the affairs of
other countries under Article 27 of the U.N. Charter as a bar to broad universal
jurisdiction.8 1 It conceded that Article 27 admits limitations relating to human
rights abuses, but only in the form of an intervention decided between states
or by the international community, such as prosecution at the International
Criminal Court.8 2 The court added that under Article 8 of the Genocide
Convention, each party-state can refer genocide matters to U.N. institutions so
that they may take necessary steps to prevent or punish them, as was done with
the creation of ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.83 The
international community has the responsibility to collectively decide whether
to prosecute foreign atrocity crimes because "today there is important doctrinal
support for the idea that no state should unilaterally devote itself to
establishing order through the application of international criminal law, against
everyone and in all the world, without there being a link that legitimizes the
extraterritorial extension of its jurisdiction."84 Hence, the court stressed that
Spain had no prerogative to unilaterally prosecute entirely foreign atrocity
crimes.
While acknowledging the vagueness and generality of Article 23.4 of the
Law on Judicial Power,85 the court declined to interpret it as allowing
prosecution of an international crime, "regardless of the location of its
commission and the nationality of its perpetrator or victim."86 In particular, it
conceded that the Genocide Convention and its codification in Article 23.4 do
not prohibit universal jurisdiction, although it declined to interpret them as
providing Spanish courts with this power since they do not "expressly"
establish universal jurisdiction. In sum, the court ruled that Scilingo could

79 Id.

80Id.§ II.6, 5.
81Id.§ 11.6, 6.
82 STS, Nov. 15, 2004, § 11.6, 6.
83 Id.
84 Id. § 11.6,
5.
85 Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial [L.O.P.J.] [Law on Judicial Power], art. 23.4 (Spain).
86 STS, Nov. 15, 2004, § 11.6, 6.
87 Id.
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be tried in Spain, although it clarified that Spanish courts could only exert a
narrow form of universal jurisdiction. Scilingo was eventually convicted of
crimes against humanity and was expected to serve thirty years in prison. 8
The Supreme Court based its opinion on one of its own recent precedents.
In 1999, Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Rigoberta Menchfi, filed a criminal
complaint in the National Audience alleging acts of genocide, torture,
terrorism, assassination, and illegal detention perpetrated by civilian and
military authorities in Guatemala between 1978 and 1986 as part of a
repression campaign against the Maya Indians.89 The allegations included a
1980 assault on the Spanish embassy where thirty-seven people were killed,
as well as the murder of four Spanish priests in a separate incident.9" The
National Audience rejected the criminal complaint except for the crimes
involving Spanish victims. 9' On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed and
narrowed the scope of Spanish universal jurisdiction, thereby providing the
precedent which it closely followed in Scilingo. However, on September 26,
2005, the Constitutional Tribunal overruled the Supreme Court's decision in
the Guatemalan case, 92 thereby effectively departing from the standard set in
Scilingo.
B. The ConstitutionalTribunalDecision
In strong language, the Constitutional Tribunal's decision in the
Guatemalan case overruled the Supreme Court's reasoning, which it found to
have wholly emasculated the principle of universal jurisdiction. The Tribunal
exercisedjudicial review under Article 24.1 of the Spanish Constitution, which
grants all persons, including foreigners,9 3 the right to access the courts to assert
"their legitimate rights and interests."94 Under Spanish constitutional law, "an
excessively strict consideration of the applicable norm" 95 and "mere
formalities or unreasonable understandings of procedural norms [should not

" Renwick McLean, Argentine Officer Convicted,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2005, at 8.

89 STC, Sept. 26, 2005 (S.T.C., No. 237) § I.

9 Id.

91Id.
92 Id.; see also Ascensio, supra note 10.

9 Constituci6n (C.E.) art. 24.1 (Spain). Foreigners have equal standing rights in Spanish
See FRANcisco RUBMO LLORENTE, DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES Y PRINCIPIOS
courts.
CONSTITUCIONALES: DOCTRINA JURISPRUDENCIAL 267 (1995).

9 STC, Sept. 26, 2005, § I(E)(5)(3)(a); C.E. art. 24.1.
STC, Sept. 26, 2005, § 11.8, 3 (citing STC, Sept. 14, 1999 (S.T.C., No. 157)).
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preclude] ajudgment on the merits."96 Consequently, the Tribunal found that
the Supreme Court's ruling had unconstitutionally prevented the Guatemalan
complainants from accessing Spanish courts. The court's narrow holding had
"practically defacto abrogated [Article 23.4 of the Law on Judicial Power]"97
by relying on criteria that "may not even be implicitly considered present in the
law" and that are contrary to the purpose of universal jurisdiction.9"
The Constitutional Tribunal thoroughly criticized the Supreme Court's
contradictory reasoning. While the Supreme Court noted that the Genocide
Convention does not prohibit universal jurisdiction, it effectively found such
a bar by ruling that Article 8 only authorizes recourse to U.N. institutions and
bars a state from unilaterally prosecuting genocide.99 The Tribunal countered
that the Convention only mentions the U.N. as a "possible" mechanism for
punishing genocide and does not imply a prohibition on party-states exercising
universal jurisdiction to punish the crime."0 0 The Tribunal also found that the
requirement of Article 6, that party-states punish alleged culprits entering
Spanish territory, is only a "minimum requirement" that does not preclude
states from exercising broaderjurisdiction.'0 ' Accordingly, the Tribunal found
that universal jurisdiction is permissible even when the Convention does not
expressly authorize it. It would be absurd to posit that entering the treaty
would limit states' ability to prosecute genocide at the national level while
non-party-states would face no such restriction. 112 Thus, the Tribunal asserted
that the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of the Genocide Convention
is incompatible with its goal of universally prosecuting genocide in order to
avoid impunity.'0 3 Further, since universal jurisdiction is not barred by the
Genocide Convention or any other treaty, it cannot violate Article 27 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as illogically argued by the
Supreme Court."

96 Id.(citing STC, Dec. 15, 2003 (S.T.C. No. 220)).
97 Id. §

11.9,

3.

98 Id. § II.8,72.

99STC, Nov. 15, 2004 (J.T.S., No. 1362), § 11.5.
3.
101Id.
102STC, Sept. 26, 2005, § 11.5, In 3-4.
100STC, Sept. 26, 2005, § II.5,

103 Id.
'04 Id. § 11.5,
2, § 7, 7 3. "A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art.
27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 35:495

Most important, the Tribunal rejected the Supreme Court's reasoning that
universal jurisdiction requires links to national interests. It found "highly
debatable" the presumption that international customary law requires such a
link and criticized the "pretended value of the precedents cited for theoretical
support" by the Supreme Court, which had misstated their holdings." 5 The
cited German cases had been supplanted by more recent decisions not
requiring a link to national interests, including a case affirming the conviction
of Serbian citizens for genocide against Bosnian citizens in Bosnia.'0 6 The
International Court of Justice's (I.C.J.) opinion in Arrest Warrantof ll April
2000 had restricted its holding to immunity considerations without ruling on
universal jurisdiction.'0 7 Finally, the Belgian Cassation Court held that
universal jurisdiction still existed under Belgian law after the aforementioned
amendment.'0 8 Moreover, the Tribunal added that the Supreme Court had
selectively omitted to mention a "multitude of precedents" contrary to its
position, such as statutes or cases from Denmark, Germany, Italy, and Sweden
not requiring links to national interests.'0 9
The Tribunal held that a link to national interests is not required because
universal jurisdiction is exclusively based on the substantive nature of grave
crimes affecting the entire international community. More specifically, it ruled
that neither Spanish nor international law restricts universal jurisdiction based
on the citizenship of alleged victims or defendants." 0 In particular, requiring
that victims of genocide be Spanish citizens contradicts the nature of the crime
and the aspiration to prosecute it universally. Under Article 607 of the Spanish
Penal Code, a genocide conviction requires acts seeking the eradication of a
national, ethnic, racial, or religious group."' Accordingly, the Supreme
Court's rule would only permitjurisdiction in cases involving Spanish victims
and criminal acts motivated by the goal of exterminating all Spaniards. Rather,
Article 23.4 of the Law on Judicial Power was logically intended to punish
genocide around the world." 2
After the Tribunal's decision, a Spanish magistrate issued international
arrest warrants against former Guatemalan military rulers Efrain Rios Montt

'0' STC, Sept. 26, 2005, § 1.6, 3.
106 Id.
107Id. (citing Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 36 (Feb. 14)).
108Id.; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
109See STC, Sept. 26, 2005, § 11.6, T 4.
110Id. § 11.9.
...C6digo Penal [C.P.] art. 607 (Spain).
112 STC, Sept. 26, 2005, § 11.9.
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and Oscar Humberto Mejia, as well as five generals for alleged genocide,
torture, and terrorism. 13 The European Parliament voted to support these
extradition efforts, the outcome of which remains unforeseeable so far. "4 The
Spanish magistrate also promulgated an order to freeze the defendants'
assets." 5 Meanwhile, Amnesty International reported that witnesses to these
alleged crimes were threatened
in an effort to prevent them from cooperating
6
with Spain's investigation.' 1
IV. PROCEDURAL RESTRAINTS ON SPANISH UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

Despite the Constitutional Tribunal's broad holding, Spain has significantly
limited the scope of its universal j urisdiction by adopting a moderate stance on
four key procedural problems. First, the National Audience has held that
incumbent heads of state are immune from prosecution,' thereby conforming
with the I.C.J.'s Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 decision."'

Obviously,

prosecuting incumbent heads of state and senior officials can drastically
damage diplomatic relations. Spain, nonetheless, does not recognize the
immunity of former heads of state and senior officials, as evidenced by its
attempt to prosecute Pinochet." 9 While prosecuting former officials can still
113 M.

Delfin, Judge Orders Arrests of Former Guatemalan Military Leaders, EL PAlS

(English version) (Spain), July 8, 2006, at 3.
114 EU Supports Rios Montt's Extradition,EL PAIS (English version) (Spain), Nov. 1, 2006,
at 4.

115 Z Como Pinochet?, EL PAlS (Spain), July 10, 2006, at 12.
116 Josd Yoldi, Amnistia Denuncia las Amenazas Contra

Testigos del Genocidio en
Guatemala,EL PAS (Spain), July 11, 2006, at 17.
"' Audiencia Nacional, Mar. 4, 1999 (No. 2723) (holding that neither Fidel Castro nor any
incumbent head of state can be prosecuted in Spain); see also CASSESE, supra note 16, at 292.
Spanish courts also declined to prosecute Silvio Berlusconi while he was serving as prime
minister of Italy between 2001 and 2006. Berlusconi is accused of tax evasion and fraud
between 1991 and 1993 as an owner of the Spanish television channel Telecinco. Even though
Berlusconi is no longer prime minister, Italy is unlikely to accede to any future Spanish requests
to extradite him, especially since he still enjoys immunity due to his nomination to a
parliamentary committee in the Council of Europe. M. Delfin, Garzrn Moves to Lift Immunity
from Trialfor Berlusconi in Wake of Election Defeat, EL PAS (English version) (Spain), Sept.
7, 2006, at 3. Berlusconi's case is nonetheless distinguishable from Castro's because he is
accused of crimes having occurred in Spain. See Jos6 Yoldi, El ConstitucionalDa Luz Verde
para que Continre el ProcesoContra Berlusconi, EL PAiS (Spain), July 29, 2006, at 23.
11' The I.C.J. held that incumbent heads of state, ministers, and other senior officials are
immune from jurisdiction while in office. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.),
2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14).
"' The I.C.J. ruled that former senior officials can be prosecuted for acts allegedly committed
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create diplomatic problems, granting them immunity could drastically curtail
the prosecution of atrocity crimes, which are generally committed with the
complicity of government authorities. Immunizing former officials may
violate both international treaty 2 ' and customary law.' Officials should not
be able to use their position as a sword to perpetrate atrocities and as a shield
There are nonetheless
to permanently protect them from prosecution.'
diplomatic issues to consider, which I explore below.
Second, Spanish law bars defendants from being tried in absentia.'2 3 Such
trials may violate international customary law and due process standards by
precluding absent defendants from presenting a cogent defense. 24 Yet, Spain
can initiate an investigation in absentia and does not have to wait for an
alleged culprit to enter its territory to have jurisdiction, as had been suggested
by the Supreme Court. 2 ' Instead, extradition is permitted to force a culprit
into Spain.126

prior or subsequent to taking office, as well as those committed in a private capacity while in
office. Id.at 36. But the I.C.J. seemed disinclined to follow Pinochet'slogic that atrocity crimes
are "private" acts to which no immunity attaches, thereby suggesting that the I.C.J. may
eventually bar the prosecution of former senior officials for atrocity crimes. See Sarah C. Rispin,
ImplicationsofDemocratic Republic ofCongo v. Belgium on the Pinochet Precedent:A Setback
for InternationalHuman Rights Litigation?, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 527 (2002).
120 For instance, the Torture Convention's text is silent about the immunity of heads of state.
United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention]. However,
the court in Pinochet held that the Convention would be emasculated if former officials could
claim immunity from prosecution outside their state of nationality. Orentlicher, supra note 34,
at 1086. "Under the Convention the international crime of torture can only be committed by an
official or someone in an official capacity." Id. (citing Pinochet III, [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 205
(H.L. 1999) (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson)). Immunity would therefore apply to all
culprits. Unless Chile waived its officials' immunity, the international crime oftorture could not
be prosecuted outside Chile, an outcome that would defeat the Convention's purpose of
establishing universal jurisdiction to avoid impunity for torturers. Id.
"2 See Jonathan H. Marks, Mending the Web: Universal Jurisdiction, Humanitarian
Intervention andtheAbrogationoflmmunity by the Security Council,42 COLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L
L. 445, 455-59 (2004).
122 Id. at 475.
'23STC, Sept. 26, 2005 (S.T.C., No. 237) § 11.7, 4.
124 It is unclear whether international customary law either permits or prohibits universal
jurisdiction in absentia. However, recent practices suggest that states may do so if they desire.
Rabinovitch, supranote 28, at 510-11. However, former I.C.J. Judge Guillaume has argued that
in absentia trials violate international customary law. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
(Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 12 (Feb. 14) (separate opinion of President Guillaume).
125 STS, Nov. 15, 2004 (J.T.S., No. 1362) § 11.6, 5.
4.
126 STC, Sept. 26, 2005, § 11.7,
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Third, the Supreme Court and Constitutional Tribunal's decisions suggest
that Spain will defer to international courts asserting their jurisdiction. The
Rome Treaty requires Spain and other International Criminal Court (I.C.C.)
member states to give preference to the I.C.C. 27 But the I.C.C.'s jurisdiction
is limited and countries with universal jurisdiction may be able to lawfully
prosecute individuals when the I.C.C. cannot.' 28 Accordingly, trials in Spanish
courts may help end impunity for atrocities.
Fourth, the Constitutional Tribunal held that Spanish jurisdiction was only
complementary. Spain must give priority to the territorial state when
proceedings have already been or will soon be initiated therein.' 29 But Spain
need not defer to these courts when "serious and reasonable proofs ofjudicial
inactivity [demonstrate] a fault, whether of will or of capacity, to effectively
prosecute the crimes."' 3 ° The Tribunal rejected the National Audience's
requirement that complainants prove that the territorial state had decidedly and
permanently rejected their complaint-an "impossible" burden of proof or
"probatiodiabolica" that would bar complainants from accessing Spanish
courts. 3 ' Through its judicial inactivity, the territorial state could bar another
32
state from exercising jurisdiction, thereby allowing impunity for atrocities.'1
While the Tribunal underlined that Spain should appropriately defer to
territorial states, it also emphasized that states have "concurrent" jurisdiction
over atrocity crimes.133 Further, Spain's Law on Judicial Power gives "broad
reach to the principle of universal justice, given that the only limit expressed
in this respect is that ... the criminal has not been acquitted, pardoned, or
punished in a foreign country.""'13 Ifthese criteria are met, Spanish prosecutors
Scheffer, Opening Address, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and
Prospects, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 233, 238 (2001).
127 David
128

Id.

130

STC, Sept. 26, 2005, § 11.4,
Id.

131

Id. §II.4,16.

132

Id. § II.4, 1 5-6. "[I]f the prosecution and punishment occur on the territory where the

129

5.

rime was perpetrated, it is more likely for the cathartic process of criminal trials to have
effect ...
" CASSESE, supra note 16, at 279. Prosecution in the state having territorial
jurisdiction locus delicti may be hard to achieve, however, because atrocity crimes "are often
committed by State officials or with their complicity or acquiescence.... [Hence] judicial
authorities may be reluctant to prosecute State agents or to institute proceedings against private
individuals that might eventually involve State organs." Id. Further, whenever prosecution
occurs, there is a clear risk that judicial authorities will be under pressure to absolve state
officials of any wrongdoing.
133 STC, Sept. 26, 2005, § 11.3,
3.
114 Id. § 11.3, 4.

514

GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.

[Vol. 35:495

do not necessarily have to defer to a territorial state because both a "literal"
interpretation of the statute and legislative intent require "absolute universal
jurisdiction."'. 5
However, the Tribunal acknowledged that other
interpretations of the statute are possible, and that its application may
subsequently be restricted by certain regulating criteria.'3
Therefore, Spain does not have pure universal jurisdiction based solely on
a crime's substantive nature, as it precludes prosecuting incumbent
government officials, trying defendants in absentia, circumventing
international courts' jurisdiction, and infringing on the territorial state's
proceedings. Despite these procedural requirements, universal jurisdiction in
Spanish courts still presents complex problems regarding evidentiary
considerations,' 3 7 forum-shopping by alleged victims,' 38 and due process
standards, including notice requirements and the bar on ex post facto
prosecutions.'3 9 These and other complex issues relating to universal
jurisdiction cannot be addressed in detail within the ambit of this Article.
Instead, I examine whether Spain's universal jurisdiction violates international
customary law.
V. INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND NATIONAL

UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

It is debatable whether Spain's rather expansive universal jurisdiction
violates international law. No treaty expressly bars universal jurisdiction.
However, the Spanish Supreme Court posited that broad universal jurisdiction
violates the long established customary rule of state sovereignty. Indeed, even
without prosecuting incumbent government officials, Spain might unlawfully
interfere in other countries' affairs by asserting jurisdiction over their citizens.
This conclusion would be supported by the maxim of parinparem non habet

Id.
Id.
137 A prosecution should not go forward unless there is compelling
evidence against the
accused. CASSESE, supra note 16, at 290. But evidence may be difficult to collect insofar as it
is remotely located in the territorial state where authorities may not cooperate with attempts to
try their nationals, especially if the authorities played a role in the crimes. Id. at 291.
135

136

138

Id. at 289-90.

"a9 See generally Eric S. Kobrick, Note, The Ex Post Facto Prohibitionand the Exercise of
UniversalJurisdictionover InternationalCrimes, 87 COLuM. L. REV. 1515 (1987) (examining
the ex postfacto clause).
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of one state should not be justiciable before the courts
imperium or "the 1acts
40
of another state."'
On the other hand, under customary law, states do not have exclusive
jurisdiction over their nationals. "[W]hen another State seeks to prosecute a
State's nationals, the latter may seek to intercede diplomatically on behalf of
its citizen on the basis of comity, but it has no legal right under international
law to insist that it be the exclusive fora for such prosecution.' 14' Moreover,
the principle of state sovereignty has undoubtedly decreased in importance in
the post-World War II era. After witnessing the atrocities of Nazi Germany
and many other oppressive regimes, the international community has
progressively recognized that a government's power ends where people's basic
human rights begin. Judge Antonio Cassese has used this premise to argue that
the dispute over sovereignty marks the confrontation of two different
conceptions of the international community: "The first is an archaic
conception, under which non-interference in the internal affairs of other States
constitutes an essential pillar of international relations. The second is a
modem view, based on the need to further universal values [against human
rights abuses]."142 In other words, it is increasingly accepted that human rights
can trump sovereign national interests.
Whereas this general evolutionary principle enjoys some support in recent
practice, 143 it does not necessarily justify broad assertions of universal
jurisdiction by states acting unilaterally at the national level. Certainly, the
international community is authorized, under certain circumstances, to
interfere with state sovereignty in order to protect human rights. For instance,
it legitimately created ad hoc tribunals to prosecute abuses perpetrated in

140

Marks, supra note 121, at 471.

141 Michael

P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based UniversalJurisdictionto Nationals of
Non-PartyStates, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 363, 377 (2001).
142CASSESE, supra note 16, at 292.
113 For instance, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (I.C.T.Y.)
emphatically held:
Dating back to a period when sovereignty stood as a sacrosanct and
unassailable attribute of statehood, this concept recently has suffered
progressive erosion at the hands of the more liberal forces at work in the
democratic societies, particularly in the field of human ights.... It would
be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal need for justice, should the
concept of State sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully against
human rights.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
55, 58 (Oct. 2, 1995).
Appeal on Jurisdiction,
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Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and it used military force to confront
situations presenting a threat to peace and security, as in Haiti in 1994.'44
However, these measures were
taken under a U.N. mandate and with the
45
approval.1
Council's
Security
Besides, it may be a non sequitur to premise the right to exercise broad
universal jurisdiction on a general evolutionary principle that may not
constitute an established rule of customary international law. "Proof of
customary international law is found in collective state practice supplemented
in some instances by widespread codification at the national or international
level"; 46 however, as noted above, universal jurisdiction for atrocities has only
existed since the post-World War II era, and especially since the 1990s.
Moreover, broad universal jurisdiction laws have essentially only been adopted
by some, not all, European states. It is therefore doubtful that an international
custom has emerged, unless we adopt a rather pretentious, Eurocentric view
that a handful of countries embody the state of international law.
Instead of extrapolating from a general evolutionary principle valorizing
human rights over state sovereignty, there are two other rationales permitting
Spain and other states to lawfully exercise broad universal jurisdiction. The
first is the Lotus principle. The second is consent by treaty.
A. The Lotus Principle
In Arrest Warrantof ll April 2002, the I.C.J. focused on immunity matters
and declined to rule on the lawfulness of Belgium's universal jurisdiction law
per se as neither country had formally raised the issue.14 7 However, two
separate groups of judges issued concurring opinions commenting on
Belgium's universal jurisdiction law. Judge Guillaume's group found
Belgium's international arrest warrant for Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, a
Congolese minister accused of gross human rights violations, to be illegal
absent a positive rule of international law authorizing it. 141 Conversely, Judge

'"See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8,1994), pmbl.; UnitedNations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, http://www.un.
org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/background.html (last visited June 28, 2007).
145

Id.

Scheffer, supra note 2, at 428.
Rabinovitch, supra note 28, at 503 (citing Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2002 (Congo v.
Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 18 (Feb. 14)).
148 Mark A. Summers, The InternationalCourtof Justice 's Decision in Congo v. Belgium:
How Has it Affected the Development of a Principle of Universal Jurisdictionthat Would
146
147
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"Higgins['] group saw it as a voluntary act unrestricted by international
' 149

law."

The disagreement between these I.C.J. concurring opinions largely mirrored
the disagreement between the previously discussed Spanish opinions. The
Guillaume group and the Spanish Supreme Court defended the principle of
conditional universal jurisdiction, which bars any proceedings unless the
accused is in the prosecuting state's custody. Moreover, they generally
reasoned that broad universal jurisdiction is prohibited unless expressly
authorizedbytreaty or customary law. Conversely, the Higgins group and the
Constitutional Tribunal licensed absolute universal jurisdiction, which permits
proceedings to begin without the accused, who can be forced into custody
through extradition in order to stand trial. 50 Further, they reasoned that broad
universal jurisdiction is permissible unless expressly barred by treaty or
customary law.
We must therefore consider whether a voluntary assertion of broad
universal jurisdiction is compatible with international customary law. At the
outset, it is necessary to clarify that neither the Higgins group nor Spain's
Constitutional Tribunal opinions advocated for purely unbridled universal
jurisdiction. Judge Higgins' concurrence stressed that states must not
transgress established international legal rules, 5 ' and Spanish jurisdiction is
narrowed by the previously stated procedural restraints.'5 2 Thus, both opinions
recognized that international customary law occasionally trumps universal
jurisdiction. Yet, they generally reasoned that a broad assertion of universal
jurisdiction does not necessarily violate the principle of state sovereignty under
customary law. Judge Higgins opined that states are virtually prohibited from
exercising criminal jurisdiction without permission in another state's territory,
although the acts alleged in Belgium's arrest warrant constituted crimes against
humanity and fit within the narrow exceptions under which universal
jurisdiction is not precluded under international law."' Similarly, the
Constitutional Tribunal rejected the Supreme Court's reasoning that broad
universal jurisdiction would violate the principle of state sovereignty. 54

ObligateAll States to Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 63, 92-93 (2003).
149Id. at

93.

"'OThe Higgins opinion suggested that even trials in absentia are permissible under
customary law, id. at 92-96, which is distinguishable from Spanish law.
Id.at 95.
151
152See supra Part IV.
1

Summers, supra note 148, at 92, 95.
Sept. 26, 2005 (S.T.C., No. 237).

1'4 STC,
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The position of the Higgins group and the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal
appears to be supported by the longstanding principle set in the Lotus
shipwreck case, which posits that, "in applying their criminal laws
extraterritorially states have a 'wide measure of discretion only limited in
certain cases by prohibitiverules.... ,155 First, there is no "prohibitive rule"
under treaty law against relatively broad universal jurisdiction. Judge Higgins
duly noted that the post-World War II international criminal treaties oblige
states to either extradite or prosecute the accused who enter their territory,
although the treaties do not bar states from voluntarilyprosecutingthe accused
outside their territory.'5 6 The Constitutional Tribunal reasoned alike in
asserting that Spain could voluntarily assert broad jurisdictional power to
prosecute international genocide, which is not expressly prohibited by the
Genocide Convention. I" 7 Second, there is no "prohibitive rule" under
customary law. The Spanish Supreme Court was mistaken in holding that a
link to national interests is requiredby customary law, as this position is
directly contradicted by precedent. For instance, a U.S. Military Tribunal in
Germany after World War II suggested that defendants charged with crimes
against humanity may be called to answer to "humanity itself, humanity which
has no political boundaries and no geographical limitations."' 58 In practice,
Eichmann may be the first case where a person accused of atrocity crimes was
tried in a state to which he had no formal ties (although Eichmann technically
had ties to Israeli holocaust survivors).' 5 9 The Israeli Supreme Court held that
it could try Eichmann on behalf of the world community because his
unspeakably heinous crimes had an "international character" and offended all
mankind. 6 0 Similarly, the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal mentioned several
European statutes and cases authorizing universal jurisdiction without links to
national interests.16" ' Hence, a link to national interests is not required by

Summers, supra note 148, at 95 (quoting S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7)) (emphasis added).
156Id. Pinochetheld alike. [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 205 (H.L. 1999) (opinion of Lord BrowneWilkinson).
157 STC, Sept. 26, 2005, § 11.7.
158Orentlicher, supra note 34, at 1116 (quoting United States v. Otto Ohlendorf, 4 TRIALS
155

OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW

No. 10, at 411,497 (1950)).
159 CASSESE, supra note 16, at 293.
160 Id. at 294.
161 STC, Sept. 26, 2005, § 11.6,
4.
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custom. Broad universal jurisdiction is therefore permitted under the Lotus
principle.
B. Consent Under Treaty Law
Enforcing an international criminal law treaty against a foreigner does not
necessarily violate the sovereignty of the accused's country. Under customary
law, states do not have exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute their nationals.' 62
Further, in the previously discussed cases, Spain's high courts held that they
could prosecute an Argentine citizen and several Guatemalan citizens for
torture, genocide, and other crimes.'63 Argentina, Guatemala, and 65
Spain are
64
all parties to the Torture Convention' and Genocide Convention. 1
66
The Torture Convention specifically provides for universal jurisdiction.
As a multilateral treaty, it is an instrument of international law, but its
provisions also comprise domestic law of a legislative and judicial nature.
States entering the treaty "are required to 'take effective legislative,
administrative, judicial or other measures' to prevent torture' ' 167 These key
terms are left to be clarified by national courts, which embroider their own
interpretive meanings to the treaty's language. The law of the Torture
Convention is therefore made at both the international and national level. 68
Thus, Spanish courts were not enforcing purely foreign law against
Argentine and Guatemalan citizens by prosecuting them under the Torture
Convention-these countries had made this treaty their law through
ratification. But Spain became a co-author of this law through its own
ratification, thereby enabling Spanish courts to legitimately prosecute
international crimes of torture. 169 By adhering to the Convention, Argentina

162

Scharf, supra note 141, at 377.
III.

163 See supra Part

" Torture Convention, supra note 120, availableathttp://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3fb/h_
cat39.htm.
165 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/pgenoci.htm.
'6 Orentlicher, supra note 34, at 1088. Some commentators have construed the 1949 Geneva
Conventions as binding parties to prosecute "grave breaches" under universal jurisdiction,
although no court has apparently directly considered the issue. Summers, supra note 148, at
76-77.
167 Orentlicher, supra note 34, at 1067 (quoting Torture Convention, supra note 120, art.
2(1)).
168 Id.
169 Id. at I100.
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and Guatemala accepted the possibility that the courts of other parties,
including Spain, could assert universal jurisdiction to prosecute acts of torture
committed in their territory. Hence, prosecuting defendants under the Torture
Convention in Spanish courts is "a model of democratically legitimate reliance
on universal jurisdiction."' 7 °
Conversely, the Genocide Convention does not explicitly provide for
universal jurisdiction.171 Argentina and Guatemala could therefore argue that
they did not foresee that another nation could use this treaty to assert universal
jurisdiction against their citizens. Yet, the Constitutional Tribunal never
pretended that the treaty required Spain to exercise universal jurisdiction to
prosecute genocide. Instead, it held that this particular universal jurisdiction
is required by Spanish law, which is permissible since it is not expressly
prohibited by the Genocide Convention,' 72 as under the Lotus principle.
There is nothing incongruous about prosecuting gross human rights
violators when the states having territorial or personality jurisdiction refuse to
abide by their treaty duty to do so. Since Argentina and Guatemala are parties
to the Conventions, they cannot logically refute their goals of ending impunity
for torture and genocide. Numerous governments, including authoritarian
regimes, hypocritically ratify treaties without any intent to enforce them and
merely to "induc[e] a feel-good factor and a good human rights rating to waive
in front of aid donors."' 73 But the Conventions mean what they say.'74 As
argued by the Tribunal, the Genocide and Torture Conventions envisage that
states will exercise "concurrent" jurisdiction over atrocity crimes to end
impunity. 75
Citizens of non-party states may argue that enforcing the Conventions
against them would violate the nullem crimen sine lege, or notice principle,
17 6
because their countries do not recognize the treaty as their law at all.
Nonetheless, based on Nuremberg, Spain could also prosecute citizens of nonparty states without violating this principle, as no one can feign ignorance of
the fact that genocide and other atrocities are punishable.'
In addition,

170Id. at
171Id. at

1104.
1088.

172STC, Sept. 26, 2005 (S.T.C., No. 237) § II.
173

Orentlicher, supra note 34, at 1089 (quoting GEOFFREY

ROBERTSON,

CRIMES AGAINST

HUMANITY 370 (1999)).
174 Id.
175 STC, Sept. 26, 2005, § 11.3, T 3.
176 Scharf, supra note 141, at 375.
177 The Nuremberg Tribunal held that it was not unjust to punish the Nazis for crimes
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"[s]ince terrorist acts and other international crimes are most often committed
by nationals of rogue states that encourage or condone such activity, limiting
the application of the treaties to nationals of State parties would significantly
undermine their effectiveness."'' 78 Accordingly, while consent by treaty may
authorize Spanish universal jurisdiction, such procedural consent may not be
required given the substantive nature of atrocity crimes.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM

More states will likely expand their own universal jurisdiction powers,
especially if Spain and other countries' laws survive any legal challenges at the
I.C.J. Therefore, there could theoretically be a chaotic situation due to a host
of competing claims over the right to prosecute the same defendants. For
example, alongside Spain, at least seven countries sought Pinochet's
extradition from the United Kingdom. 7 ' A reasonable procedure may be
needed to resolve such claims.
A quagmire could be avoided insofar as the discordant U.N. Security
Council could agree to exercise its prerogative to refer cases to the I.C.C.,"8 °
a decision that Spain and other I.C.C. members would have to respect. Even
when the I.C.C. lacks prosecutorial jurisdiction, it could technically be
empowered to serve as a clearinghouse to decide which country has the
priority to prosecute. The I.C.J. could also resolve disputes between states, as
in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v.
Belgium). A new international advisory group could be created to help
adjudicate competing claims, perhaps under the U.N. International Law
Commission or International Court of Arbitration.' 8'
While such procedures may become indispensable, it is unlikely that the
expansion ofuniversaljurisdiction will be wholly unmanageable. Past practice
suggests that states will not prosecute atrocity crimes adnauseam. First, given
the high number of atrocity crimes recurrently perpetrated around the world,
prosecutors and magistrates will not overburden themselves with investigating

prescribed in the Nuremberg Charter because they must have known that their atrocities were
wrong, regardless of whether they were permitted by the state having territorial or personality
jurisdiction. Id.Professor Scharf cites several U.S. precedents where courts enforced treaties
against citizens of non-party states. Id. at 379-82.
178 Id. at 382.
"79See White, supra note 1,at 146-47.
180 See Scheffer, supra note 2, at 429-3 1.
'8' Id. at 430.
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more than a mere fraction of all cases. Second, foreign policy constraints will
lead them to avoid many delicate cases. For example, several European
countries resisted American encouragements to prosecute Pol Pot, the nowdeceased Cambodian Khmer Rouge leader, and Abdullah Ocalan, the Kurdish
rebel of Turkey, even though they easily could have done so under domestic
universal jurisdiction laws.' 82
Aside from competing jurisdictional claims, the expansion of universal
jurisdiction may lead to other problems, such as inconsistent rulings by
different countries' courts,' 83 including diverging interpretations of identical
treaty provisions and conflicting evaluations of the state of international
85
84
customary law, forum-shopping by victims,' and abuses by rogue states.1
Be that as it may, universal jurisdiction and its benefits should not be
abandoned altogether due to the fear of a worst case scenario. We might be
witnessing the beginning of the end of outright impunity for atrocities, as
universal jurisdiction "contributes to a conception of international criminal
justice that, in combination with the ICC, might at least aspire to become
systematic.' 8 6 Some degree of procedural rigor is nonetheless warranted
given universal jurisdiction's potential pitfalls. The need to end impunity
"should not lead to incaution in determining exactly what it is that should be
87
done."
VII. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF SPANISH UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
Whereas Spain's universal jurisdiction might not be barred by the I.C.J., it
may not survive political pressure in spite of its deterrent value. Belgium
already succumbed to international pressure to drastically amend its own
law. ' Many complaints had been filed in Belgian courts for essentially
political reasons, as evidenced by their timing.8 9 Certainly, Spain's universal
182 Scheffer,
'8
184

supranote 127, at 235.

CASSESE, supra note 16, at 290.

Id. at 289.
185States antipathetic to Western powers could use universal jurisdiction in bad faith to stage
baseless show trials against political enemies. See PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 18.
186 Marks, supra note 121, at 470.
187 Morris, supra note 32, at 361.
188See Halberstam, supra note 55.
189 Notably, after Ariel Sharon became the Israeli prime minister in 2001, he was charged
with alleged genocide and war crimes dating back to 1982. Id. at 248. After America invaded
Iraq in 2003, former President George H.W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of
State Colin Powell, and other U.S. officials were charged with alleged war crimes in the 1991
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jurisdiction is much narrower than Belgium's former law, which authorized
incumbent head-of-state prosecutions and in absentia trials. But Spain's law
is expansive enough to cause many diplomatic headaches. Political pressure
has already led senior Spanish executive officials to protest that Spain should
not prosecute crimes in Argentina and Chile, including crimes against Spanish
victims."'
While Scilingo has been the only person tried and convicted thus far, at
least five other Argentine repressors are in Spanish custody. Juan Carlos Fotea
Dimieri should soon be tried in Spain. 9 ' However, the others are facing
extradition requests to Argentina, which seeks to try them for various crimes.
Notably, Maria Estela de Per6n, known as Isabel, who became Argentina's
president between July 1974 and March 1976 as the widow of authoritarian
president Juan Domingo Per6n, was arrested in Spain after Argentina
demanded her extradition so that she could be tried for crimes related to her
role in leading a bloody repression campaign against dissidents.' 92 Perhaps in
a deliberate effort to avoid prosecution for these and other crimes, Isabel Per6n
had fled to Spain, where she lived since 1981.193 The fact that she ultimately

Gulf War. Id. at 250-51. General Tommy Franks was also charged with war crimes allegedly
committed during the 2003 Iraqi invasion. Id. at 252.
190 Boyle, supra note 37, at 191.
'9' Fotea, a former police official in Argentina, was arrested in Madrid on November 24,
2006. Jos6 Yoldi, Detenidoen Madridun PoliciaArgentinoAcusado delAsesinato del Escritor
Walsh, EL PAlS (Spain), Nov. 25, 2005. Since 1977, Fotea had exiled himself in Madrid, where
he did profitable business in the real estate and security services industries. Benjamin Prado, El
Lobo, EL PAS (Spain), Dec. 1, 2005. Spain will try him for the kidnapping of Alicia Milia de
Pirles, an Argentine woman now residing in Spain. It is also expected that Fotea will eventually
be extradited to Argentina, which seeks to try him for the murder of Rodolfo Walsh, a famous
Argentine novelist and journalist who also engaged in armed resistance with the Montoneros,
a Peronist group. These alleged crimes were apparently part of a systematic repression campaign
during the Argentine junta's Dirty War. Josd Yoldi, Espahla Juzgari al RepresorArgentino
Fotea Aantes de Extraditarlo,EL PAlS (Spain), Nov. 23, 2006, at 12; Ernesto Ekaizer, Who
Killed Rodolfo Walsh?, EL PAiS (Spain) (English Version), Nov. 30, 2005, at 5.
192Oriol Giell & Jorge Marirrodriga, IsabelitaPer6n Convalece en la UCI de un Hospital
de Madrid,ELPAiS (Spain), Feb. 14,2007, at 9; see also Larry Rohter, Argentine Ex-President
ChargedWith Rights Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2007, at 3. Isabel Per6n is accused of, inter
alia, ordering various political assassinations and of arming the Argentine Anticommunist
Alliance, known as the "Triple A." Gflell & Marirrodriga, supra note 192. The Triple A was
a paramilitary fascist group that was supported by the Argentine government, notably between
1974 and 1975. LEWIS, supra note 3, at 140-41. Its mission was to kill and repress leftists, not
only communist guerrillas, but also peaceful dissidents, including union activists, academics, and
journalists. Id.
193Jorge A. Rodriguez, IsabelitaPerrn Queda en LibertadProvisional Tras Ser Detenida
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obtained Spanish citizenship might enable her to avoid being extradited to
Argentina,194 although she could still be tried in Spain on the basis of universal
jurisdiction.
On the other hand, it is expected that Spain will extradite Ricardo Taddei' 95
and Rodolfo Eduardo Almir6n Sena to Argentina. 96 Similarly, a Spanish court
has halted its prosecution of Ricardo Cavallo' 97 because Argentine courts have
started proceedings against him, which may lead to an extradition request.'98
The Argentine cases suggest that Spanish courts can be moderate in
asserting their universal jurisdiction. First, the courts have declined to
prosecute most defendants whose extradition was sought by Argentina, which
is the state having territorial jurisdiction and obviously the greatest link to the
cases concerned. Second, insofar as Spain has sought to prosecute Argentine
repressors, this has not posed a major diplomatic problem since these
repressors are vilified as gross human rights violators in Argentina, where they
would also likely face prosecution if not tried in Spain.

en Madrid,ELPAiS (Spain), Jan. 13, 2007, at 2.
9 Id.; see also Slaking a Thirstfor Justice, ECoNOMIST, Apr. 14, 2007, at 40.
9 Jorge A. Rodriguez, Detenido en MadridunEx MilitarArgentinoAcusado de 161 Casos
de Secuestro o de Tortura,ELPAiS (Spain), Feb. 10, 2006, at 24. Taddei was arrested in Madrid
on February 8,2006. Spain will likely extradite him to Argentina, which seeks to try him for 161
cases of torture and kidnapping. Id. Taddei entered Spain legally in 1985 and maintained a
lawful immigration status. He kept a low profile as the owner of a modest shoe repair and key
duplication shop in Madrid. Jorge A. Rodriguez, El Pasado Crueldel Buen Zapatero,EL PAlS
(Spain), Feb. 12, 2006, at 26. According to one of his alleged victims who was sequentially
detained in five separate concentration camps during Argentina's Dirty War, Taddei was the
"toughest" when it came to ordering torture and confessed his admiration for Adolf Hitler.
Natalia Junquera, Era el TorturadorMis Duro, El Que Daba 6rdenes, EL PAls (Spain), Feb.
10, 2006, at 24; see also A. Eatwell, Argentine Former Police Officer Arrested in Madrid to
Face Kidnap and Torture Charges, EL PAs (English version) (Spain), Feb. 10, 2006, at 3.
196J.A. Rodriguez & J. Marirrodriga, La Policia Detiene En Valencia a un Jefe de la
UltraderechistaTripleA deArgentina,ELPAS (Spain), Dec. 29,2006, at 26. Almir6n, who had
lived in Spain since 1983, was presumably the military chief of the Argentine Anticommunist
Alliance. Id.; see supra note 192.
"' Spanish prosecutors had charged Cavallo, a former Argentine military official, with one
count of genocide, seven murders, 152 assaults, and 407 terrorism charges. Manuel Marraco,
La FiscaliaAcusa de Genocidio al Ex MilitarArgentino Cavallo, EL MUNDO (Spain), Jan. 12,
2006, at 27. In June 2003, Spain obtained Cavallo's extradition from Mexico. Cavallo had
assumed a false identity in Mexico, where he managed to obtain a prominent post as the director
of the National Center for Vehicle Registration. Mrndez, supra note 11.
198Julio M. Ldzaro, LaAudienciaRenunciaaJuzgaralRepresorArgentinoSerpico, ELPAs
(Spain), Dec. 21, 2006, at 28.
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Conversely, Spanish courts may be perceived as quite immoderate, if not
radical, and certainly far less diplomatic in asserting their universal jurisdiction
against defendants who are not facing prosecution in their respective countries
because they are considered innocent of any wrongdoing by their national
governments and courts. Spanish courts have already thrust themselves in this
difficult situation by accepting cases against defendants from China and the
United States, which have both steadfastly opposed these defendants'
prosecutions in Spain or even in their own national courts.
In the case of China, an alleged victim, a Spanish national of Tibetan origin
named Thubten Wangchen, as well as two non-profit organizations filed a
complaint against former high-profile Chinese officials for genocide in
Tibet. 9' 9 The defendants include former president Jiang Zemin, former prime
minister Li Peng, and five other former officials.2"' Wangchen was enthused
after making his first declaration in court, arguing that this was a "historic day"
because it was the "first time" that a Tibetan could tell a judge about the
alleged genocide.2"' He nonetheless was pragmatic in stating that he did not
expect that China would extradite the former officials to Spain,20 2 which is a
prerequisite for a trial to go forth since Spanish law would not authorize an in
absentia trial.20 3 But he expressed hope that the case would increase
international discussion about Tibet so that "the Chinese government
recognizes its errors and starts respecting human rights."2'04 In a separate case,
several exiled Chinese citizens and Falun Gong members filed a complaint
against other officials alleging genocide and torture, including trafficking of
organs forcibly harvested from Falun Gong members.20 5 Hundreds, if not
thousands, of Falun Gong members have been killed or detained due to the
Chinese government's repression of this opposition group and its "spiritual"
movement.20 6
In protest, China reiterated its longstanding position that it has absolute
sovereignty over its citizens and rejects any foreign interference in its domestic

199
200

Pekin, supra note 14.
Id.; Yoldi, supra note 14; Christine A.E. Bakker, UniversalJurisdictionofSpanish Courts

over Genocide in Tibet: Can It Work?, 4 J. INT'L GRIM. JUST. 595 (2006).
211 See Pekin, supra note 14.
202 Id.
203STC, Sept. 26, 2005 (S.T.C., No. 237) § 11.7, 4.
204 Pekin, supra note 14.
205Junquera, supra note 195.
206 Pekin, supra note 14.
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affairs "under the pretext of human rights.""2 7 Statements by the Chinese
government decried the accusations in the Tibet and Falun Gong cases, stating
that they were "complete defamation, an absolute lie ' 20 8 as well as
"'calumnies' . . . motivated by political reasons [in order to] damage the
international image of China and bilateral relations between Spain and
China. 2 9 Regarding the Falun Gong case, a spokesman for the Chinese
Embassy in Spain stated that Falun Gong is "an illegal sect, which causes
illnesses and makes people crazy ....
The complaint is exaggerated and
210
false.
In the eyes of the Chinese regime, Spain added insult to injury when
it also granted asylum to several Falun Gong members. 21 ' The Chinese
government also summoned Spain's ambassador in Beijing in order to give
him an earful about Spain meddling in Chinese affairs.2" 2
The Spanish executive seemed fairly receptive to these complaints, as it
undoubtedly seeks to preserve its profitable relations with China, the new
economic behemoth. A Spanish prosecutor, who apparently spoke in the name
of the executive branch, said he opposed these proceedings by arguing that
Spanish courts cannot be "universal pursuers ofjustice,"" 3 thereby disagreeing
with the Constitutional Tribunal.
The prosecutor distinguished the
Guatemalan genocide case tried in Spain from the Chinese cases by arguing
that Spain has "historical, language, and even moral links" with Guatemala,
unlike the "exotic and distant" China. 2 4 He also challenged the validity of the
genocide charge in the Falun Gong case, specifically questioning whether
215
Falun Gong is a religious group covered by the definition of genocide.
Nevertheless, the Spanish executive is essentially powerless to stop the
proceedings because the investigations are conducted by judges empowered
to accept cases and act as pseudo prosecutors in Spain's inquisitorial system.
The Spanish Foreign Ministry actually stated that the executive branch
207 Jos6 Reinoso, China Acusa a Espaha de InjerenciaporDarAsilo a Miembros de Falun

Gong, EL PAlS (Spain), June 14, 2006, at 19.
208 Pekin, supra note 14.
209 Reinoso, supra note 207.
210 Junquera, supra note 195.
2 Reinoso, supra note 207.
212 El Gobierno Chino Cita al EmbajadorEspaholpor las Causas Judicialesdel Tibet y
Falun Gong, EL PAiS (Spain), June 9, 2006, at 1.
213 La Represidn China,Ante laAudienciaNacional,ELPAs (Spain), June 12, 2006; see also
Pekin, supra note 14.
214 J.M. L~.zaro, El Supremo OrdenaInvestigar el Presunto Genocidio de Falun Gong, EL
PAs (Spain), June 7, 2006.
215 Id.
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"maintains a scrupulous respect for judicial decisions. 2, 6 However, this
justification is unlikely to satisfy the Chinese government, which does not
recognize a meaningful separation of powers in its own political system.217
In addition to drawing the ire ofthe Chinese government, Spain's expanded
universal jurisdiction has already led to tensions with the United States, an
even closer 9trategic ally. In a controversial judicial decision, Spain indicted
three American soldiers for the death of a Spanish journalist who was killed
when their tank fired at the Hotel Palestine in Baghdad on April 8, 2003.218
Based on the Constitutional Tribunal's decision to expand universal
jurisdiction, Spanish courts were deemed competent to try the American
soldiers for what was deemed a "crime against the international community"
and a crime against civilians protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention.2 19
Santiago Pedraz, the Spanish magistrate handling the case, asserted that the
soldiers must have known that the hotel was situated in a civilian area and was
only occupied by journalists. 22 Because the magistrate deemed that no
evidence demonstrated that the soldiers were under attack, he contended that
the soldiers' use of force was an act of reprisal or intimidation against
journalists who were critical of the war. 22 ' This allegation was disputed by the
U.S. government, whose investigation concluded that the soldiers had abided
by the applicable combat rules and not committed any crime, 22 and that the
soldiers were targeting a sniper located on the hotel's roof. 2 . The U.S.
government has also refused to cooperate with Spain's investigation.2 24 Spain,
nonetheless, issued an international arrest warrant against the three soldiers,
much like the warrant formerly issued against Pinochet.225 It is highly unlikely
216 Pekin, supra note 14.
217 See generallyJoseph Kahn, Deep Flaws,andLittleJustice,in China'sCourtSystem, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005, at 1.
218 Soldiers Indicted in Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2007, at 5; Josd Antonio Hernndez,

ProcesadosTres MilitaresDe EE UUPorLaMuerte Del CtimaraJosg Couso, ELPAlS (Spain),
Apr. 28, 2007, at 21; see also John F. Bums, 3 JournalistsDie in U.S. Strikes on 2 Baghdad
Buildings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2003, at 2.
219 J.M. Ld.zaro, ElSupremo OrdenaReabrirEl 'Caso Couso 'En ContraDe La Audiencia,
EL PAlS (Spain), Dec. 6, 2006, at 19.
220 Hernindez, supra note 218.
221 Id.
222 Jos6 Antonio Hernhndez, EE UURechaza FacilitarAl Juez Datos De Quienes Mataron
A. Couso, EL PAS (Spain), Feb. 5, 2007, at 23.
223 Thom Shanker, US. Says Shot Firedat Hotel Was Justified,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2003,
at 14.
224 Hermnndez, supra note 222.
225 Hernndez, supra note 218.
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that the soldiers will ever be brought into Spanish custody, as a U.S. State
Department spokesman stated that it will be a "very cold day in hell" before
American soldiers have to answer to Spanish courts.226
Moreover, Ismael Moreno, a Spanish magistrate, is currently investigating
whether any legal violations were committed by American or Spanish officials
when Spain allowed numerous U.S. government planes to transit in Spain on
their way to the U.S. military base in GuantAnamo, Cuba.227 The origin and
final destination of the planes remain unknown, although the investigation
determined that at least one plane originated from Afghanistan.228 This judicial
investigation was spurred by a criminal complaint filed by several Spanish
human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs).229 Judge Moreno has
also accepted to investigate accusations of torture against agents from the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) whose flights transited through Spain as
part of the practice of "extraordinary rendition,"23 the transfer of terrorism
suspects to countries where they allegedly face torture or other harsh
interrogation methods.2 3'
The U.S. government will predictably construe the three aforesaid cases
against American defendants, not only as an assault on American sovereignty,
but also as an unjustified challenge to the lawfulness of America's "War on
Terror" by foreign magistrates who sit atop an ivory tower and indulge in antiAmerican biases. Indeed, while the U.S. government has insisted that
"aggressive" methods are necessary to defend America against dangerous
terrorists, it has flatly denied that it tortures terrorism suspects. 2 The judicial
proceedings against Americans in Spain could consequently lead to
considerable diplomatic frictions. But this may only be the beginning. Faced
with eventual complaints from purported victims, Spain will likely have to

226 Josd Yoldi, El Juez Reactiva La Orden De Detener A Los MilitaresDe EE UU Que

MataronA Couso, EL PMS (Spain), Jan. 17, 2007, at 21.
227 M.G., La Acusaci6n Pide al Juez que Indague los Vuelos Desde Bases Espaholas a
Guantdnamo, EL PAjS (Spain), Mar. 5, 2007, at 30; Miguel GonzAlez, EE UU Utiliz6 las Bases
de Rota, Mor6n y Torrej6n ParaSus Vuelos a Guantcnamo, EL PAiS (Spain), Feb. 12, 2007,
at 22.
228 Gonz~lez, EE UU Utiliz6, supra note 227.
229 M.G., La Acusaci6n, supra note 227.
230 Miguel GonzAlez, La Acusaci6n Pide al Juez que Impute a lost 13 Agentes de la CIA que
Hicieron Escalaen Palma, EL PAlS (Spain), Dec. 20, 2006, at 22.
23,EU CountriesIgnored CIA TerrorSuspect Flights,Report Says, GUARDIAN (London),
Feb. 14, 2007, availableat http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,,2012966,00.html.
232Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Defends CIA's ClandestinePrisons; 'We Do Not Torture,'
PresidentSays, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2005, at A15.
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decide whether to prosecute former officials in even more controversial cases.
For instance, the German Supreme Court has received complaints from human
rights groups asking that Donald Rumsfeld be tried for war crimes after he lost
diplomatic immunity pursuant to his resignation as the U.S. secretary of
defense.233
In the end, Spanish judicial and prosecutorial authorities may not allow
these cases to go forward due to political and economic costs. Time will tell
whether Spain is prepared to confront other countries, especially strategic
allies, if they remove their ambassadors and threaten diplomatic retaliation in
defense of their sovereignty against Spanish universal jurisdiction.
Conceivably, Spain may ignore allegations against former officials of
certain "untouchable" countries while targeting relatively powerless
defendants. This approach may be predicted by the Belgian precedent, where
the prosecutions of high-profile political and military figures, incumbent or
not, had not advanced to the merits before Belgium dismissed many cases
under its new law.234 Conversely, Belgium tried and convicted four Rwandan
civilians who were sentenced to prison terms ranging from twelve to twenty
years for genocide.2 35
[T]he [Rwanda] case proceeded to trial because of a unique
combination of historical conditioning factors: (1) the presence
of the accused in Belgium during the investigation; (2) the
severity of the atrocities of which they were accused; (3) the
strength of the evidence against them; (4) the sense that the
prosecution was apolitical and not tantamount to taking sides in
a distant political conflict; (5) the absence of an effective
judiciary in the state where the atrocities took place and the
presence of one in Belgium; (6) the special links between the
state of the crime and Belgium; (7) the political powerlessness of
the defendants; and (8) the lack of opposition from any state, in
particular Rwanda, to their prosecution. 6

233 El DestituidoJefe del Pent6gono,DemandadoporCrimenes de Guerra,ELPMs (Spain),
Nov. 25,2006, at 5; Mark Landler, 12 DetaineesSue RumsfeldIn Germany, CitingAbuse, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006, at 17.
234 Ratner, supra note 55, at 893.
235 Id. at 889.
236 Id. at 892.
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Since cases involving dictators and other officials have stalled largely due to
diplomatic considerations, the conviction of vulnerable Rwandan civilians may
have been an example of hypocritical and paternalistic neocolonialism by
Belgium against one of its former colonies in Africa,2 37 especially since only
a Western country is likely to have the time and money to investigate and
prosecute entirely foreign atrocity crimes. Though the neocolonialist critique
may be exaggerated,2 38 the Rwandan case exemplified how universal
jurisdiction laws will necessarily be enforced unequally if some defendants are
considered untouchable.
Regardless of any neocolonialist biases,2 39 the law will inevitably be
enforced discriminatorily. Atrocity crimes are typically perpetrated on a wide
scale, which means that prosecutors can only prosecute a fraction of all
perpetrators, generally focusing on those most responsible. Prosecuting top
officials attracts extensive public attention, thereby setting an example to deter
atrocities worldwide. Yet, singling out political leaders might offend
democratic egalitarian values and the Kantian principle of not using a person
as a means to an end.
The worst discrimination would occur if Spain refuses altogether to
prosecute certain untouchable characters. But Spain might conceivably be
justified in doing so if prosecuting them would create diplomatic problems
damaging Spanish political and economic interests. Perhaps "it is unrealistic
to see universal jurisdiction as charity work for forum states."24 Aside from
human rights benefits, a state should also be entitled to "consider its own
24
interests in deciding whether to prosecute., 1
There may be good reason to require only the attorney general to
pursue any such charges so that lower level prosecutors and
magistrates who wish to act independently of the national
237 Id. at 894.
238

Persons from developing countries are likely to be disproportionately charged with atrocity

crimes. Rabinovitch, supra note 28, at 519. But this does not necessarily evince discrimination
insofar as these crimes have disproportionately occurred in developing countries like Cambodia,
East Timor, Rwanda, and Sudan.
239

A neocolonialist critique ofuniversaljurisdiction may also question whether a country has

the moral authority to act as the conscience of the world by judging other countries' abuses

despite its own record of abuses. For instance, in Spain's case, some may question under what
pretense Spanish courts may act as universal guarantors of human rights given Spain's own
history of colonialism, slavery, and fascism.
240 Ratner, supra note 55, at 893.
241

Id.
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government cannot trigger an international witch-hunt that may
or may not be politically motivated or lack merit. There is no
guarantee against politically motivated charges at the highest
national level either, but the chances of that happening may be
fewer if the political realities of interstate relations and the need
to prevent judicial chaos in the international system influence
national authorities.242
Instead, in Spain, magistrates like Baltasar Garz6n have played an important
role in driving proceedings.2 43 It is unclear whether this arrangement will
remain manageable if Spain's caseload grows to include more cases tied to
complex political situations.
Complications will arise if defendants only on one side of a political
conflict are charged, such as Palestinians and not Israelis or vice versa.
Atrocity crimes frequently occur during military or political conflicts where
all sides tend to commit-gross human rights violations. Spain might therefore
be tempted to be "fair" and prosecute perpetrators on all sides. But this may
fail to bring a "fair" result if each case does not have the same outcome, which
would lead critics to protest that Spain is taking sides in a political conflict.
At the same time, any attempt to ensure that defendants on all sides receive the
same verdict and sentence would compromise judicial independence and the
integrity of the truth-finding process. Spain may therefore be thrust into an
intractable situation provoking negative political repercussions. Additionally,
if complaints are only or mostly brought by victims on one side of a conflict,
Spanish magistrates or prosecutors might be tempted to intervene and bring
complaints against the other side to even the balance, which could prove very
awkward. Of course, one might counter that such considerations are irrelevant
Scheffer, supra note 2, at 429.
See generally Simons, supra note 53. Judge Garz6n has become a celebrity in Spain for
pursuing international human rights violators and many other high-profile defendants. He has
reopened proceedings against Silvio Berlusconi, the former Italian prime minister, for tax
evasion and fraud. Yoldi, supra note 191. He has led proceedings against corrupt Spanish
officials, drug dealers, and terrorists from Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Basque separatist
group. See, e.g., Ana Portalo, Baltasar Garzrn, EPOCA (Spain), July 7, 2006, at 44. Judge
Garz6n is also investigating Spanish officials accused of falsifying intelligence reports to pretend
that ETA was linked to the Madrid terrorist attacks of March 11, 2004. Josd Yoldi, Garzrn
Impute a Tres Peritosque Reconocen HaberFalseadoel lnforme que Vincula a ETA con el 11M, EL PAs (Spain), Sept. 30, 2006, at 18. Further, Judge Garz6n is investigating Hassan El
Haski, who is suspected of being one of the actual culprits in the attacks. Josd Yoldi, Garz6n
Seguir6 Investigando el Caso en Relacirn con El Haski, EL PAiS (Spain), Oct. 5, 2006, at 19.
242
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since the purpose of penal law is to punish the guilty in a particular case, even
if other culprits are uncharged.
Universal jurisdiction might also violate the separation ofpowers. Because
many cases will have diplomatic implications, the judiciary may become
24
entangled in foreign policy decisions generally handled by the executive.
For example, judges will have to weigh whether protecting human rights
justifies offsetting national political or economic interests. This separation of
powers critique could go further into accusing the Spanish Constitutional
Tribunal of usurping the elected legislature's power with judicial activism.
Statutory law was essentially silent on the issue of links to national interests
and conditional or absolute jurisdiction.2 45 The Spanish Supreme Court read
this as an implicit bar on broad jurisdiction. The Tribunal saw it as an implicit
authorization. Regardless of which interpretation was correct, judges can
interpret statutes broadly or narrowly, and this largely depends on their
subjective beliefs.
Nevertheless, all of these problems are unlikely to convince human rights
purists that Spain's universal jurisdiction is too broad. In particular, while
purists might concededly accept unequal selective enforcement of the law
insofar as it can deter human rights violations, they will not make compromises
in their quest to ensure that no violators are considered untouchable. Purists
believe that "[n]either a legislature preparing a statute, nor a public prosecutor
determining whether to take a case, nor an investigating judge preparing it for
2 46 To purists' credit,
trial should be influenced by [political pressure] .,
there
is little merit to the claim that prosecuting top officials automatically entails
an abuse of universal jurisdiction for "political" reasons. Atrocity crimes are
generally committed or sponsored by government officials for political
motives. So it is essentially a truism to argue that there is a "political"
dimension to a prosecution. Further, a prosecution is not necessarily "abusive"
if based on reasonable probable cause or another appropriate legal standard
assessed by judicial and prosecutorial authorities.
By expanding universal jurisdiction over all culprits regardless of political
pressure or national interests, the purist approach increases deterrence and
contributes to reducing impunity for atrocities. International treaties cannot
deter atrocities without a "credible threat of enforcement. 2 47 This may be

244 CASSESE, supra note 16, at 290.
245

See Ley Orginica del Poder Judicial [L.O.P.J.] [Law on Judicial Power], art. 23.4 (Spain).

2'46Ratner, supranote 55, at 893.
247

Orentlicher, supra note 34, at 1064.
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what the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal had in mind when it held that links
to national interests were not required. The narrow conditional universal
jurisdiction proposed by the Spanish Supreme Court was little more than a
travel ban. Few human rights abusers venture into countries where they can
be prosecuted and face years in prison, leaving Spain powerless to prosecute
those responsible for all but a minute fraction of atrocities. Conversely, under
the Tribunal's holding, Spain will be able to initiate investigations in absentia
and use extradition processes to force the accused into Spain to stand trial.248
This will have much greater deterrence potential than a mere travel ban. Of
course, many culprits may never be punished, especially if extradition requests
are commonly rejected. Authorities may end up investigating numerous
complaints that will not result in prosecution.249 Still, "the stigma associated
with investigations and prosecutions, even in absentia, will in some measure
Moreover, deterrence depends
punish criminals" and help deter atrocities.
largely on notifying political and military officials that human rights abuses
will not be tolerated. Spain's foray into international criminal justice helped
provide such notice by raising public consciousness about the importance of
human rights and the need to hold abusers accountable.
It is nonetheless noteworthy that, far from deterring human rights abuses,
universal jurisdiction might actually reinforce the status quo by enticing
despots to cling onto power rather than step down and face prosecution for
their crimes.2 5 1 In Spain's case, this is especially likely to occur when the
prospective defendant is an incumbent head of state. Indeed, because Spain
grants immunity to incumbent heads of state, all they have to do to avoid being
248 See STC, Sept. 26, 2005 (S.T.C., No. 237).
249 CASSESE, supra note 16, at 290.
250 Rabinovitch, supra note 28, at 520.
251 Enrique de Diego, ElJuez Veleta, EPOCA (Spain), Mar. 23, 2007, at 16-17. This criticism

of Spanish universal jurisdiction is part of a broader position that argues against international
justice, including prosecution in international courts, insofar as it has the potential to hamper
democratic transition. For instance, the International Criminal Court has issued warrants seeking
the apprehension of five leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army, a Ugandan militia allegedly
responsible for killing tens of thousands of victims and other atrocities. Emily Wax, Net
Tightens AroundNorthern Uganda'sBrutalRebel Militia;Lord's ResistanceArmy Unchecked
for 20 Years, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2005; Press Release, International Criminal Court, Warrant
ofArrest Unsealed Against Five LRA Commanders (Oct. 14,2005), availableathttp://www.icccpi.int/pressreleasedetails &id=1 14&l=en.html. The case has stalled partly due to an ongoing
controversy over whether the Ugandan government should grant the men amnesty in exchange
for a peace deal. See generally Will Kony Come Out of the Bush?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 2006,
at 56; Heeding Truce, Rebel LeaderFrom Uganda Waits in Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2006,
at 18.

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 35:495

prosecuted in Spain is remain in power."' Rather than dissuade human rights
abuses, Spanish universal jurisdiction might actually dissuade abusers from
stepping down, thereby paradoxically enabling them to commit more abuses.253
While Spanish universal jurisdiction may reinforce the status quo under
these circumstances, it can have. a positive impact by spurring domestic
prosecutions in countries that are amenable to change. Spain's highly
publicized effort to prosecute Pinochet and Argentine repressors probably
contributed to putting domestic prosecutions for past abuses back on the
agenda in Chile and Argentina. When Judge Garz6n started Spain's
investigations in 1996, Pinochet was still the Chilean army's commander-inchief.2 54 However, by the time Pinochet died following a heart attack on
December 10, 2006, he had become increasingly recognized by Chileans and
others as the tyrant and mass human rights violator that he was.255 Pinochet
was stripped of his untouchability after distinguished Spanish and British
judges held that he was not immune from prosecution for atrocities. This may
have emboldened and inspired Chilean judges and prosecutors in their
subsequent efforts to try and hold Pinochet accountable.2 56 After the British
executive branch refused to extradite Pinochet to Spain and allowed him to
return to Chile, 257 he was charged in Chile with ordering and covering up the
killings of political opponents by a death squad shortly after his coup. Yet, the
courts eventually deemed him mentally unfit to stand trial due to his poor
health.'
Pinochet was ultimately re-prosecuted. In November 2005, he was
arrested and "charged with tax evasion, passport forgery and other crimes
associated with his possession of hundreds of illegal bank accounts, many of
them in the United States., 259 Additionally, in October 2006, Pinochet was
placed under house arrest after being charged with kidnapping, torture, and
260
murder at a secret detention center in the early years of his dictatorship.
Even though Pinochet died before being tried, the Chilean attempts at

252 de Diego, supra note 251, at 14-21; see also supranote 117 and accompanying text.

253de Diego, supranote 251.
254 Spain's UncharteredForayinto World Justice,supra note 3.
255 See Kandell, supra note 40.
256 See Orentlicher, supranote 34, at 1124-27.
257 See supranote 48 and accompanying text.
28 Clifford Krauss, Chile Court Bars Trial ofPinochet,N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2001, at 1; see
also Orentlicher, supranote 34, at 1071-72 nn.76-78.
259 Monte Reel, PinochetFacesNew Charges;Chile's Ex-DictatorAccused
ofTax Evasion,
Illegal Accounts, WASH. POST,Nov. 24, 2005, at A22.
260 Pinochet Under House Arrest in PrisonTorture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at 6.
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prosecution were meaningful. While Pinochet escaped justice, other elements
from his past regime may not. Michelle Bachelet, the Chilean president, has
been pushing for the revocation of an amnesty law that shields numerous
abusers from prosecution.26 '
Similarly, when Judge Garz6n started his investigations, "none of the
estimated 3,500 Argentines involved in the 'dirty war' were in jail for their
crimes. ' ' 2 62 At least 175 Argentine repressors have been charged in Argentina
with gross human rights violations since the Spanish investigations began.263
Further, in August 2003, the Argentine Congress repealed two amnesty laws
promulgated in the 1980s.264 This action was partly a response to Judge
"Garz6n's issuance of warrants seeking the extradition of 45 Argentine
military officers and one civilian., 265 The Argentine government also
prevented suspected repressors from fleeing abroad.266 Of course, it is
impossible to know whether Chile and Argentina would still have conducted
these prosecutions without Spain's involvement. While causality cannot be
ascertained, it is probable that Spain's intervention bolstered or invigorated
efforts to prosecute gross human rights violators in Chile and Argentina.267 In
turn, the prosecutions in Argentina and Chile have inspired human rights
advocates in Brazil to try and prosecute key officers of that country's past
military dictatorship on allegations of torture against political prisoners.2 68
Thus, Spain's efforts to prosecute foreign atrocity crimes may have farreaching repercussions in Latin America by bringing forth a virtuous circle
against impunity.
Despite its positive influence, it is uncertain whether Spain's foray into
international criminal law will last much longer. The Constitutional Tribunal's

261

Larry Rohter, Chile 'sLeaderAttacksAmnestyforPinochet-EraCrimes,N.Y. TIMES, Dec.

24, 2006, at 13.
262 Spain's UnchartedForay into World Justice, supra note 3.
263 Id.; see also Slaking a Thirstfor Justice, supra note 194.
264Orentlicher, supra note 34, at 1127. Since then, the Argentine Supreme Court
unanimously invalidated pardons that former president Carlos Menem had granted to two former
military chiefs who had previously been convicted and received life sentences. Jorge
Marirrodriga, Un TribunalArgentino DeclaraIlegal ellndulto a Dos Militaresde la Dictadura,
El PAis (Spain), Apr. 26, 2007, at 13. This decision was partly based on the ground that gross
human rights violations are ineligible for a presidential pardon. Id.
265Orentlicher, supra note 34, at 1127.
266 Spain's UnchartedForayinto World Justice, supra note 3.
267 See Slaking a Thirstfor Justice, supra note 194.
26' Larry Rohter, Groups in Brazil Aim to Call Military Torturers to Account, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 2007, at 12.
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broad authorization of universal jurisdiction may have unintended
consequences. Litigants from around the world could flock to Spanish courts
to file criminal complaints, especially since Belgium has now mostly closed
its courts to foreign victims. This litigation could lead Spain to face intense
diplomatic pressure. Spanish legislators may resolve the matter by amending
the law to significantly narrow universaljurisdiction as Belgian legislators did.
Paradoxically, the Constitutional Tribunal accused the Supreme Court of
having "practically de facto abrogated" universal jurisdiction,26 9 although the
Tribunal's decision might cause the same result if it leads Spanish legislators
to emasculate the expanded universalj urisdiction law, unless Spain is prepared
to pay the price for truly defending human rights.
VHI. CONCLUSION
The modem drive to prosecute foreign atrocity crimes in national courts
based on universal jurisdiction is virtually unprecedented. Jurists sharply
disagree over the appropriate scope of universal jurisdiction, as evidenced by
the radically different views of Spain's high courts. While broad universal
jurisdiction may be permissible under international law, Spain and other
countries nonetheless have an important responsibility to exercise procedural
rigor in enforcing their laws. Moreover, the international legal system could
benefit from the creation of a reasonable procedural mechanism to resolve
competing jurisdictional claims by states seeking to try the same defendants.
In any event, by prosecuting entirely foreign atrocity crimes in its courts, Spain
will help deter human rights violations and reduce impunity for
atrocities-assuming its universal jurisdiction law survives a potential I.C.J.
challenge and assuredly intense political pressure.
The efforts by Spain and other countries to prosecute certain gross human
rights violators sharply contrast with the impunity afforded to numerous other
repressors. After stepping down, Haiti's "Baby Doc" Duvalier enjoyed a
lavish lifestyle in the French Riviera, Paraguay's Alfredo Stroessner kept a
mansion outside Brasilia, and Uganda's Idi Amin stayed comfortably in
Jeddah.27 ° Although universal jurisdiction could help avoid such impunity,
attempts to prosecute abusers in foreign courts will remain controversial.
When Pinochet was detained in England pursuant to Spain's extradition
269 STC, Sept. 26, 1005 (S.T.C., No. 237).
27" Daniela Deane, Former DictatorsMay Find Exile Not Quite As Safe, USA TODAY, Oct.

28, 1998, at 14A.
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request,2"7' former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, protested
' Notably, she declared that Pinochet was
vehemently against this "tragedy."272
a British "friend" and ally, and that "there is no evidence of [his] involvement
in, or even knowledge of, the cases concerned....,2 She warned of "an
international lynch-law which, under the guise ofdefending human rights, now
threatens to subvert British justice and the rights of sovereign nations. "274
Thatcher's arguments exemplified the belief that political interests somehow
excuse or justify impunity for gross human rights violations. However, "[t]he
notion that political imperatives immunize any individual from [prosecution
for atrocities] is quickly losing credibility, and no democratic government...
could champion such impunity and remain true to the fundamental governing
principles of a modem civilized society., 275 Spain, essentially acting through
its judiciary, is leading the international community by example in insisting
that impunity for wide-scale atrocities simply cannot be tolerated.

271 See Hoge, supra note 48.
272

Pinochet Was This Country's Staunch, True Friend: Full Text of Margaret Thatcher's

Speech to the Blackpool Fringe,GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 6, 1999, available at http://www.
guardian.co.uk/tory99/Story/O,,202256,00.html.
273

Id.

Id. Thatcher also stated: "Pinochet was this country's staunch, true friend in our time of
need when Argentina seized the Falkland Islands... [b]ut how did the authorities under this
Labour Government chose [sic] to repay it? I will tell you - by collaborating in Senator
Pinochet's judicial kidnap." Id. In her eyes,
revenge by the Left, not justice for the victim, is what the Pinochet case is all
about. Senator Pinochet is in truth on trial, not for anything contained in
Judge Garzon's indictment, but for defeating communism. What the left can't
forgive is that Pinochet undoubtedly saved Chile and helped save South
America.
Id. Thatcher's remarks overlooked the nonpartisan humanistic principle that human rights
abuses are intolerable, whether committed by rightists, leftists, or others.
275 David J. Scheffer, Staying the Coursewith the InternationalCriminalCourt, 35 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 47, 52-53 (2002).
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